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Ecosystems that are used and managed by humans for the ecosystem services they
provide may exhibit multiple stability domains (“basins of attraction”) that diﬀer in
fundamental system structure and behavior. As a result of exogenous natural distur-
bances or human management, a system may ﬂip from one stability domain into another
one with diﬀerent basic functions and controls (Holling 1973, Levin et al. 1998, Scheﬀer
et al. 2001). As a consequence, also the level, composition and quality of ecosystem
services may abruptly and irreversibly change. Examples encompass a diverse set of
ecosystem types that are highly relevant for economic use, such as boreal forests, semi-
arid rangelands, wetlands, shallow lakes, coral reefs, or high-seas ﬁsheries (Gunderson
and Pritchard 2002).
The term “resilience” has been used to denote an ecosystem’s ability to maintain its
basic functions and controls under disturbances (Holling 1973, Carpenter et al. 2001).
The economic relevance of ecosystem resilience is obvious, as a system ﬂip may en-
tail huge welfare losses.1 For example, a combination of drought, ﬁre and ill-adapted
livestock grazing management in sub-Saharan Africa, central Asia and Australia have
lead to severe degradation and desertiﬁcation of semi-arid rangelands, which provide
subsistence livelihood for more than one billion people worldwide. Once degraded,
these grassland ecosystems cannot be used as pasture anymore (Perrings and Walker
1995, Perrings and Stern 2000). In Africa alone, almost 75% of semi-arid regions are
threatened by degradation and desertiﬁcation (UNO 2002). Worldwide, the income loss
associated with desertiﬁcation of agricultural land is estimated to some 42 billion US
dollars per year (UNCCD 2005).
An ecosystem’s resilience in a given stability domain can be measured by the proba-
bility that exogenous perturbations make the system ﬂip into another stability domain.
1Accordingly, some have included a reference to the provision of desired ecosystem services right
into the deﬁnition of ecosystem resilience, e.g. as the capacity of an ecosystem “to maintain desired
ecosystem services in the face of a ﬂuctuating environment and human use” (Brand and Jax 2007: 3,
referring to Folke et al. 2002).
2Therefore, enhancing the resilience of a particular (desired) domain reduces the likeli-
hood of a ﬂip into another (less desired) domain. It is for this reason that ecosystem
resilience has been referred to as “insurance”, e.g. in the following manner:
“Resilience can be regarded as an insurance against ﬂips of the system into
diﬀerent basins of stability.” (M¨ aler 2008: 17)
“[R]esilience [...] provides us with a kind of insurance against reaching a
non-desired state.” (M¨ aler et al. 2009: 48)
“The link between biodiversity, ecosystem resilience and insurance should
now be transparent. [...] It follows that the value of biodiversity conservation
lies in the value of that protection: the insurance it oﬀers against catastrophic
change.” (Perrings 1995: 72)
“The resilience of the ecological system provides ‘insurance’ within which
managers can aﬀordably fail and learn while applying policies and practices.”
(Holling et al. 2002: 415)
So far in the resilience literature, the term “insurance” is employed in a rather metaphoric
manner – as a metaphor for “keeping an ecosystem in a desirable domain”. It is used
to convey the message that resilience is a desirable property of some ecosystem since
it helps to prevent catastrophic and irreversible reductions in ecosystem service ﬂows.
While ecosystem resilience obviously and undoubtedly includes an insurance aspect, no
explicit attempt has been made so far to use a clearly deﬁned concept of “insurance”
from the established literature on insurance and ﬁnancial economics. As a result, it
remains unclear what exactly constitutes the economic insurance value of ecosystem
resilience, how it depends on ecosystem properties, economic context, and the ecosys-
tem user’s risk preferences, and how it relates to the total economic value of ecosystem
resilience.
In an attempt to conceptually determine and to empirically capture the economic
value of ecosystem resilience, M¨ aler et al. (2007) and Walker et al. (2007) have suggested
3to use the shadow price of resilience as a measure of its economic value. They calculate
the present discounted value of future improvements in welfare from ecosystem services,
where these future improvements accrue from reduced risks of a system ﬂip due to a
unit increase in the initial level of resilience. While this procedure establishes the total
economic value of resilience, it does not explicitly relate it to any idea of “insurance”.
In this paper, we aim to close that gap and to provide some conceptual clariﬁcation.
Any idea of “insurance” fundamentally refers to a combination of three elements: (i)
the objective characteristics of risk in terms of diﬀerent possible states of nature, (ii)
people’s subjective risk preferences over these states, and (iii) a mechanism that allows
mitigation of (i) in view of (ii). We believe that the ongoing discussion of resilience as an
insurance could be clariﬁed and fruitfully advanced if reference to these three elements
was made explicitly and rigorously, and we propose an analytical framework for that
purpose. We adopt a clear and generally accepted deﬁnition of “insurance” from the
risk and ﬁnance literature, according to which insurance is an action or institution that
mitigates the inﬂuence of uncertainty on a person’s well-being (McCall 1987). Based
on this deﬁnition, we conceptualize resilience’s economic insurance value as the value of
one very speciﬁc function of resilience: to reduce an ecosystem user’s income risk from
using ecosystem services under uncertainty. We also analyze how exactly the insurance
value of ecosystem resilience depends on ecosystem properties, economic context, and
on the ecosystem user’s risk preferences.
Our analysis yields several interesting and important results. First, the insurance
value of resilience is negative for low levels of resilience and positive for high levels of
resilience. That is, ecosystem resilience actually functions as an economic insurance only
at suﬃciently high levels of resilience; it does not function as an economic insurance at
low levels of resilience. Second, the (marginal) insurance value of resilience increases
with the level of resilience – for some ecosystem types even monotonically. This is in
contrast to normal economic goods, the (marginal) value of which decreases with their
quantity. Third, the insurance value of resilience is one additive component of its total
economic value. That is, the total economic value of resilience is larger than just its
insurance value. While the latter may be negative, the total economic value of resilience
4turns out to be always positive.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a stylized model of an
ecological-economic system that describes how diﬀerent degrees of ecosystem resilience
are related to diﬀerent system outcomes, and how this contributes to an ecosystem
user’s well-being under uncertainty. In Section 3, we clarify what exactly we mean by
“insurance” and “insurance value”. On this basis, in Section 4, we present our results
about the economic insurance value and the total value of ecosystem resilience, with all
proofs and formal derivations contained in the Appendix. In Section 5, we discuss these
ﬁndings and draw conclusions.
2 Model
To discuss the economic insurance value of ecosystem resilience, we propose the following
simple and stylized model of an ecological-economic system. Consider an ecosystem that
potentially exhibits two diﬀerent stability domains with respective levels of ecosystem
services-production. One domain is characterized by a high level of ecosystem service
provision and corresponding net income yH ∈ Y ; the other domain is characterized by
a low level of ecosystem service provision and corresponding net income yL ∈ Y ; with
Y ⊆ IR+ and yL < yH, so that
∆y := yH − yL > 0 (1)
is the potential income loss when the system ﬂips from the high-production into the
low-production stability domain.
Initially, the ecosystem is in the high-production stability domain. In this domain,
exogenous stochastic disturbances threaten to trigger a ﬂip into the low-production
stability domain. Such a ﬂip may occur with probability p with 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. Conversely,
the ecosystem stays in the high-production domain with probability 1−p.
In line with Holling’s (1973) notion of resilience as the maximum amount of distur-
bance a system can absorb in a given stability domain while still remaining in that sta-
bility domain, we deﬁne and measure resilience as a continuous state variable R ∈ [0,1]
5that determines the probability of the system ﬂipping from the high-production into the
low-production stability domain as follows:
p = p(R) with p
0(R) ≤ 0 for all R and p
0(R) < 0 for all R ∈ (0,1) (2)
and p(0) = 1, p(1) = 0 . (3)
In words, the higher the ecosystem’s resilience in the high-production domain, the lower
the probability that it ﬂips into the low-production domain due to exogenous distur-
bance; with zero resilience, it ﬂips for sure; and with maximum resilience it will certainly
not ﬂip. For future reference, we deﬁne R through p(R) = 1/2 as the level of resilience
at which the probability of a system ﬂip exactly equals the probability of the system not
ﬂipping. This is the level of resilience at which the future state of nature is maximally
uncertain.
In order to give more ecological structure to our ecosystem model (2)–(3), in some
parts of our analysis we assume the following more speciﬁc model about the relationship
between the level of resilience R and the ﬂip probability p:
p(R) = 1 − R
1−σ with − ∞ < σ < 1 . (4)
This model has the fundamental resilience-deﬁning properties (2) and (3). In addition,
it has the analytically handsome property that p0(·) is a constant-elasticity function of R,
where the parameter σ is the (constant) elasticity of p0(·),2 i.e. σ speciﬁes by how much
(in percent) the ﬂip probability’s slope increases when the level of resilience increases by
1%. For short, we will refer to σ as “the ecosystem’s elasticity”. As σ may be positive















Lacking ecological evidence or a plausible guess on the value of σ, we will study the
full range of theoretically possible values of σ. Notwithstanding this generality, the
2Note that (4) implies −p00(R)R/p0(R) = σ.
3For σ = 0, p00(R) = 0 holds also for R = 0 and R = 1. Yet, for σ < 0, one has p00(0) = 0, and for
σ → 1, one has p00(1) → 0.
6case of σ = 0 has an epistemically outstanding importance. For, one may argue that
one can meaningfully deﬁne and measure the system’s state variable “resilience” only
through, and not independently of, the observable variable “ﬂip probability”.4 Such
an epistemic equivalence between the state variable R and the observable p is exactly
what is expressed by σ = 0. In this case, (4) reduces to a linear negative relationship,
p(R) = 1−R, so that resilience is measured directly in units of reduced ﬂip-probability.
As this case has an epistemically outstanding importance, we will treat the case of σ = 0
as the preeminent case, and discuss the cases of σ < 0 and σ > 0 against it.
Given the ecosystem model (2), (3) – or, more speciﬁcally, model (4) – the ecosystem
user thus faces a binary income lottery {yL,yH;p(R),(1 − p(R))}. That is, given that
the system is initially in the high-production stability domain and is characterized by
a level R of resilience, the system will provide net income yL with probability p(R) and
net income yH with probability 1 − p(R). Obviously, with changing level of resilience
R the statistical distribution of income will also change. As in our simple analytical
framework only the level of resilience R may vary, R uniquely characterizes the income
lottery. One may thus speak of “the income lottery R”.
We assume that the ecosystem user only cares about (uncertain) income, and not
directly about the underlying states of nature in terms of resilience. The ecosystem
user’s preferences over income lotteries are represented by a von Neumann-Morgenstern
expected utility function
U = ER[u(y)] with u
0(y) > 0 and u
00(y) < 0 for all y , (5)
where ER is the expectancy operator based on the probabilities of lottery R, y is net
4If the system’s state space was one-dimensional, one could indeed meaningfully deﬁne and measure
the system’s resilience (sensu Holling 1973) independently of the system’s ﬂip probability, namely as
the “distance” in state space – measured in units of the single state variable – between the current
system state and the threshold between stability domains. However, if the system is characterized by
more than one state variable, the “distance” in state space is not uniquely deﬁned but requires some
metric which is not naturally given. Then, the system’s resilience in a given stability domain cannot be
measured through some distance in state space, but only through the observable consequence in terms
of ﬂip probability.
7income,5 and u(y) is a continuous and diﬀerentiable Bernoulli utility function which is
assumed to be increasing and strictly concave, i.e. the ecosystem user is non-satiated
and risk averse.6 In order to study in the most simple way how the insurance value of
resilience depends on the ecosystem user’s degree of risk aversion, we assume that the
ecosystem user is characterized by constant absolute risk aversion in the sense of Arrow
(1965) and Pratt (1964), i.e. −u00(y)/u0(y) ≡ const., so that the Bernoulli utility u(y)
function is
u(y) = −e
−ρy with ρ > 0 , (6)
where the parameter ρ measures the ecosystem user’s risk aversion.
3 Conceptual clariﬁcation: insurance and insurance
value
Before we derive results about the economic insurance value of ecosystem resilience in
the next section, in this section we provide exact deﬁnitions of the terms “insurance”,
“insurance value” and “total economic value”. Adopting a very general and widely
accepted deﬁnition, insurance may be deﬁned in the following way (cf. McCall 1987).
Deﬁnition 1
Insurance is an action or institution that mitigates the inﬂuence of uncertainty on a
person’s well-being or on a ﬁrm’s proﬁtability.
In the concrete setting described in the previous section, the term “insurance” takes
on a more concrete meaning. As a person’s (here: the ecosystem user’s) well-being
is determined by a preference relation over income lotteries, insurance is about the
5For notational simplicity, y denotes both the random variable income and income in a particular
state of the world.
6While risk aversion is a natural and standard assumption for farm households (Besley 1995, Das-
gupta 1993: Chapter 8), it appears as an induced property in the behavior of (farm) companies which
are fundamentally risk neutral but act as if they were risk averse when facing e.g. external ﬁnancing
constraints or bankruptcy costs (Caillaud et al. 2000, Mayers and Smith 1990).
8mitigation of income uncertainty, and the person’s risk preferences specify what changes
in the income lottery actually constitute a “mitigation”. Thereby, uncertainty exists due
the existence of many potential future states of the world (here: high and low ecosystem-
service production), in each of which the state-speciﬁc income is known (yH and yL) and
the probability of which is also known (1−p(R) and p(R)). That is, uncertainty comes
in the form of risk in the sense of Knight (1921).
In this more concrete understanding of the term, insurance may come in many forms.
One example is the classic insurance contract that an insuree signs with an insurance
company under private law, and which speciﬁes that the insuree pays an insurance pre-
mium to the insurance company in all states of the world and in exchange obtains from
the insurance company an indemniﬁcation payment if and only if one particular unfa-
vorable state of the world should occur. Another example is so-called “self-protection”
(Ehrlich and Becker 1972), which means that a person undertakes some real action that
reduces the probability by which an unfavorable – in terms of net income – state of
the world occurs. In this terminology, an increase in the ecosystem’s resilience by the
manager may be interpreted as insurance because it is a real action that may provide
self-protection in terms of net income obtained from the ecosystem.
In order to precisely deﬁne and measure the economic insurance value of some act of
self-protection (here: an increase in the ecosystem’s resilience), we follow Baumg¨ artner
(2007: 103–104). One standard method of how to value the riskiness of an income lottery
to a decision maker in monetary terms is to calculate the risk premium RP of the lottery,
which is deﬁned by (e.g. Kreps 1990, Varian 1992: 181)7
u(ER[y] − RP) = ER [u(y)] . (7)
In words, the risk premium RP is the amount of money that leaves a decision maker
equally well-oﬀ, in terms of utility, between the two situations of (i) receiving for sure the
expected pay-oﬀ from the income lottery R, ER[y], minus the risk premium RP, and (ii)
playing the risky income lottery R with random pay-oﬀ y.8 In the model employed here,
7By Equation (7), ER[y] − RP is the certainty equivalent of lottery R, as it yields exactly the same
expected utility as playing the risky lottery, ER [u(y)].
8The risk premium is, thus, the maximum amount of money that a decision maker would be willing
9the risk premium as deﬁned by Equation (7) uniquely exists because, by assumption (cf.
Section 2), y ∈ Y with Y as an interval of IR, and u is continuous and strictly increasing
(Kreps 1990: 84). In general, if the Bernoulli utility function u characterizes a risk averse
decision maker, i.e. if ρ > 0 in Equation (6), the risk premium RP is strictly positive.
The economic insurance value of resilience can now be deﬁned based on the risk
premium of the income lottery R as follows.
Deﬁnition 2
The insurance value V of resilience is given by the change of the risk premium RP of
the income lottery R due to a marginal change in the level of resilience R:




Thus, the economic insurance value of ecosystem resilience is the marginal value of
its function to reduce the risk premium of the ecosystem user’s income risk from using
ecosystem services under uncertainty. Being a marginal value, it depends on the existing
level of resilience R. The minus sign in the deﬁning Equation (8) serves to express a
reduction of the risk premium as a positive value.
As it is apparent already from Deﬁnition 2 (and as it will become more explicit in the
following section), the economic insurance value of ecosystem resilience has, in general,
an objective and a subjective dimension. The objective dimension is captured by the
ecosystem’s sensitivity of the ﬂip probability p(R) to changes in the level of resilience,
σ; the subjective dimension is captured by the ecosystem user’s degree of risk aversion,
ρ. If the ﬂip probability would not vary with the level of resilience (i.e. p0(R) ≡ 0), or if
the ecosystem user was risk-neutral (i.e. ρ = 0), the risk premium RP of income lottery
R would not vary with R, thus yielding a vanishing insurance value of resilience.
The insurance value of resilience is only a fraction of resilience’s total economic value,
namely the value of its function to reduce the risk premium of the ecosystem user’s
income risk from using ecosystem services under uncertainty. Beyond its insurance
value, resilience also has economic value in its function to increase the ecosystem user’s
to pay for getting the expected pay-oﬀ from the income lottery, E[y], for sure instead of playing the
risky income lottery with random pay-oﬀ y.
10expected income from ecosystem services. In order to characterize the insurance value
of resilience as a fraction of its total economic value, we adopt the following general
and widely accepted deﬁnition of total economic value under uncertainty (e.g. Freeman
2003: Chap. 8).
Deﬁnition 3
The total economic value TEV of resilience is given by the maximum willingness to pay
WTP per unit for a marginal increase of ∆R in the level of resilience R:





where WTP is deﬁned through
ER [u(y)] = ER+∆R [u(y − WTP(∆R))] . (10)
In words, we measure the total economic value of a change ∆R in resilience as
the maximum willingness to pay (WTP) for that change, more exactly as the WTP
per marginal unit of resilience. The maximum willingness to pay for the increase ∆R
in resilience is the amount of money that leaves an individual indiﬀerent, in terms
of expected utility, between the two situations of (i) resting in the original position
with resilience R and (ii) paying the amount WTP and getting into a situation with
resilience R+∆R.9 As value is typically expressed as a per-unit quantity characterizing
a marginal change, we divide WTP by ∆R and let ∆R → 0 to obtain the marginal
value of resilience. Being a marginal value, it depends on the existing level of resilience
R.
9In the language of welfare measurement, WTP is the Hicksian compensating surplus for a ﬁnite
change of ∆R in the level of resilience (Hicks 1943, Freeman 2003: Chap. 3). Alternatively, one could also
use the Hicksian equivalent surplus to measure the monetary value of the welfare change associated with
a ﬁnite change of ∆R in the level of resilience, that is, the minimum amount of monetary compensation
to the individual (“willingness to accept”, WTA) that leaves the individual indiﬀerent between the two
situations of (i) resting in the original position with resilience R and receiving a monetary payment of
WTA and (ii) getting into a situation with resilience R + ∆R. In general, WTP and WTA will diﬀer
for ﬁnite changes of ∆R. However, for the marginal changes studied here, i.e. for ∆R → 0, WTP and
WTA coincide, so that the value of TEV (R) does not depend upon whether WTP or WTA is used in
the deﬁning Equation (9).
11In the simple model studied here, with no other constraints or alternative options
for action in place, the total economic value of resilience as deﬁned by Deﬁnition 3,
evaluated at the socially optimal level of resilience, is exactly equivalent to its shadow
price (as measured e.g. by M¨ aler et al. 2007, Walker et al. 2007).
4 Results
Using the concepts deﬁned in Section 3, we can make statements about the model
described in Section 2, and, thus, about the economic insurance value of ecosystem
resilience. To start with, we discuss the risk premium associated with diﬀerent levels of
resilience.
Lemma 1
The risk premium RP(R) of the income lottery R is given by











which has the following properties:
(i)
RP(0) = RP(1) = 0 and RP(R) > 0 for all R ∈ (0,1) . (12)
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(iii) There exists ¯ σ with 0 < ¯ σ ≤ 1 and
d¯ σ
d(ρ∆y)
> 0 , lim
ρ∆y→+∞
¯ σ = 1 , lim
ρ∆y→0
¯ σ = 0 , (16)
10For σ = 0, the statement about the sign of RP0(R) holds also for R = 0 and R = 1. Yet, for σ < 0,





   
   
for R > ˜ ˜ R if σ < 0
for all R ∈ (0,1) if and only if 0 ≤ σ ≤ ¯ σ
for R < ˜ ˜ R if σ > ¯ σ
, (17)
where ˜ ˜ R is deﬁned through RP 00( ˜ ˜ R) = 0 for σ < 0, and through ˜ ˜ R = min{R | RP 00(R) =
0} for σ > ¯ σ, so that ˜ ˜ R > <
˜ R for σ > < 0.
(iv) For all R ∈ (0,1)
dRP(R)
dρ
> 0 and lim
ρ→0RP(R) = 0 , (18)
dRP(R)
d∆y
> 0 and lim
∆y→0














˜ R , (20)
and lim
σ→1RP(R) = lim
σ→−∞RP(R) = 0 . (21)
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Result (12) states that the risk premium of income lottery R is strictly positive at all
levels of resilience in between 0 and the maximum level of 1, and is zero at the extreme
levels of 0 and 1. That is, income is risky at all levels of resilience in between 0 and 1;
and only at the extreme levels of 0 and 1 does the income risk vanish, as in the case
R = 0 the system will ﬂip into the low-productivity domain with income yL for certain,
and at R = 1 the system will remain in the high-productivity domain with income yL
for certain.
As a consequence of Result (12), the risk premium varies with the level of resilience
in a non-monotonic way (Figures 1 and 2, orange line). Result (13) states that there
uniquely exists a level ˜ R of the domain’s resilience at which the risk premium is maximal,
that is, the income lottery is most risky ( ˜ R = 0.647 in Figure 1, ˜ R = 0.794 in Figure 2
left, ˜ R = 0.004 in Figure 2 right). For R > ˜ R a marginal increase in resilience reduces the
13risk premium, and for R < ˜ R a marginal increase in resilience raises the risk premium.
This maximum-income-risk level of resilience, ˜ R (Equation 14), is strictly in between
R and 1, where R > 0 denotes the level of resilience at which the probability of a
system ﬂip exactly equals the probability of the system not ﬂipping (Result 15a).11 So,
the maximum-income-risk level of resilience ˜ R is always strictly larger than the level of
resilience R, at which the future state of nature is maximally uncertain. Also, the range
(0, ˜ R] of low levels of resilience, for which the risk premium is strictly increasing with
resilience, is non-empty.
Furthermore, the maximum-income-risk level of resilience ˜ R increases with the degree
of risk aversion ρ and the potential income loss ∆y, it decreases with the ecosystem’s
elasticity σ (Result 15b).
The statement about the second derivative of the risk premium (Result 17) is rather
technical, and will be needed for the proof of an important property of the insurance
value in Proposition 1 below. Essentially, it states that there exists a domain of (positive)
values of ecosystem elasticity, 0 ≤ σ ≤ ¯ σ, including the preeminent case of σ = 0, for
which the risk premium is strictly concave over the entire range of resilience (Figure 1,
orange line). This domain of ecosystem elasticities is bounded from below by zero, and
from above by some maximal value ¯ σ, which has the properties stated in Result (16): it
increases with the risk-aversion-weighted potential income loss, ρ∆y, and for ρ∆y going
to inﬁnity (zero) approaches the maximal ecosystem elasticity of one (zero).
The more risk-averse the ecosystem user is, the larger the perceived riskiness of the
income lottery R and the larger the associated risk premium (Result 18). For a risk-
neutral individual, on the other hand, the risk premium would be 0 for all R. Similarly,
for the potential income loss ∆y (Result 19): the risk premium raises with an increasing
potential income loss ∆y. For equal income levels in both stability domains, which
means no income loss in case of a system ﬂip (∆y = 0), the risk premium would be zero
over the whole range of R.
Result (20) states that the risk premium increases (decreases) with the ecosystem’s
11Note that R, which is deﬁned through p(R) = 1/2, will be greater than (equal to, smaller than)
1/2 for σ < 0 (= 0, > 0).
14elasticity for levels of resilience below (above) the maximum-income-risk level of re-
silience, ˜ R. That is, in the range of resilience where the riskiness of income increases
(decreases) with resilience, i.e. for R < (>) ˜ R (cf. Result 13), an increase in ecosystem
elasticity increases (decreases) the riskiness of income. This can be seen from compar-
ing the orange lines in Figures 2 (left), 1 and 2 (right), as σ increases in this order.
Ecosystem elasticity thus has the very same ambivalent role as ecosystem resilience for
the riskiness of income. Result (21) states that the risk premium vanishes as the ecosys-
tem’s elasticity approaches either its maximum or its minimum value. The reason is
that in either limiting case, according to model (4), the ﬂip probability p(R) does not
depend on the level of resilience any more, except for the extreme levels of R = 0 (for
σ → 1) or R = 1 (for σ → −∞) where it jumps from one to zero or from zero to one,
respectively. As a result, the risk premium is non-vanishing only at R = 0 (for σ → 1)
or R = 1 (for σ → −∞), but vanishes for all other levels of resilience.12
Having explored the eﬀect of the ecosystem user’s risk preferences and ecosystem
properties on the risk premium of income lottery R, we can now discuss the insurance
value of resilience as introduced in Deﬁnition 2.
Proposition 1
The insurance value of resilience, IV (R), is given by







1 + p(R)(eρ∆y − 1)

, (22)
which has the following properties:













˜ R ,where ˜ R is given by Equation (14) . (23)
12Note that an overall vanshing risk premium, except for either R = 0 (for σ → 1) or R = 1 (for
σ → −∞) is compatible with Result (20)’s statement that the risk premium increases with σ for R < ˜ R,
because ˜ R decreases with σ (Result 15).
13For σ = 0, the statement about the sign of IV (R) holds also for R = 0 and R = 1. Yet, for σ < 0,
one has IV (0) = 0; for σ → 1, one has IV (1) → 0.
15(ii) The insurance value is globally increasing with resilience,
IV (0) < IV (1) , (24)




   
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for R > ˜ ˜ R if σ < 0
for all R ∈ (0,1) if and only if 0 ≤ σ ≤ ¯ σ
for R < ˜ ˜ R if σ > ¯ σ
, (25)
where ¯ σ and ˜ ˜ R are as deﬁned in Lemma 1(iii).
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     
     
0 for

     
     
R < 0R
R = 0R






IV (R) = lim
σ→−∞
IV (R) = 0 , (29)
where ˜ R is as deﬁned in Lemma 1(iii) and 0R < ˜ R < R0.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Result (23) states that the insurance value of resilience may be negative or positive,
depending on the level of resilience R. If resilience is below the maximum-income-risk
level ˜ R, an increases in resilience raises the risk premium (Result 13) and therefore,
as the insurance value is deﬁned as the reduction in the risk premium (Deﬁnition 2),
resilience has a negative insurance value for all R < ˜ R. Only if R > ˜ R, an increase in











































































Figure 1: Risk premium (orange curve), insurance value (green curve), expected value
(vertical distance between green and blue curves) and total value (blue curve) as a
function of resilience for the case of intermediate ecosystem elasticity 0 ≤ σ ≤ ¯ σ. The
dashed line marks the maximum-income-risk level of resilience R = ˜ R. (Parameter
values: σ = 0, ∆y = 110, ρ = 0.017)
Result (24) states that the insurance value of ecosystem resilience globally increases
with the level of resilience: it is strictly higher for the maximum level of resilience than
for zero resilience. Result (25) states that for a domain of (positive) values of ecosystem
elasticity, 0 ≤ σ ≤ ¯ σ (including the preeminent case of σ = 0), the insurance value
of ecosystem resilience increases even strictly monotonically with the level of resilience
(Figure 1, green line). Only as ecosystem elasticity σ turns negative or exceeds the
threshold value ¯ σ, it may happen that the insurance value locally decreases.14 For
14A parameter value of σ < 0 in Function (4) implies a relationship between p and R such that
the ﬁrst marginal units of resilience starting from R = 0 do not have any signiﬁcant impact on the

















































































































































Figure 2: Risk premium (orange curve), insurance value (green curve), expected value
(vertical distance between green and blue curves) and total value (blue curve) as a
function of resilience for the two extreme cases of negative ecosystem elasticity (σ < 0,
left) and very large positive ecosystem elasticity (σ > ¯ σ, right). The dashed line marks
the maximum-income-risk level of resilience R = ˜ R. (Parameter values, left: σ = −0.88;
right: σ = 0.92; both: ∆y = 110, ρ = 0.017)
negative ecosystem elasticity, σ < 0, it may be that the (negative) insurance value
locally decreases at levels of resilience smaller than ˜ ˜ R (Figure 2 left, green line); and for
very large positive ecosystem elasticity, σ > ¯ σ, it may be that the (positive) insurance
value locally decreases at levels of resilience greater than ˜ ˜ R (Figure 2 right, green line).
In economic terms, an increasing insurance value means that the higher the level
of resilience, the more valuable – as an insurance – is a marginal increase in resilience.
This is unusual and in contrast to normal economic goods, the marginal value of which
decreases with their amount: normally, the more abundant a good, the less valuable the
next marginal unit. Technically, the increasing marginal value of resilience comes about
signiﬁcantly lower the ﬂip probability p. For such ecosystems, the insurance value of resilience decreases
for small levels of resilience and increases for high levels of resilience close to R = 1 (Figure 2 left, green
line). Conversely, a parameter value of σ close to its maximum value of R = 1 means that the ﬁrst
marginal unit of resilience has a huge impact on the reduction of the ﬂip probability p, whereas all
later units of resilience only have a negligible eﬀect. Under such circumstances, the insurance value of
resilience steeply increases in the vicinity of R = 0 from a negative value to its maximum (positive)
value and then decreases with R (Figure 2 right, green line).
18as the objective function, expected utility (5), when expressed as a function of the level
of resilience, is non-concave in R.
Result (26) states how the ecosystem user’s degree of risk-aversion aﬀects the insur-
ance value. If the ecosystem user was risk neutral (ρ = 0), the insurance value would
vanish for all levels of resilience R. With increasing risk-aversion, the insurance value
increases for high levels of R > ˜ R, where it is positive, and decreases for low levels
of R < ˜ R, where it is negative. Thus, the more risk-averse the ecosystem user is, the
steeper the curve for IV (Figure 1, green line). The same goes for the potential income
loss ∆y (Result 27). For equal income levels in both stability domains, which means
no income loss in case of a system ﬂip (∆y = 0), the insurance value would vanish for
all levels of resilience R. With increasing potential income loss ∆y, the IV -curve gets
steeper, as the insurance value decreases for R < ˜ R and raises for R > ˜ R.
Also, ˜ R shifts to the right with both increasing risk-aversion ρ and increasing poten-
tial income loss ∆y. For very high values of ρ or ∆y the IV -curve appears to be sharply
bended around ˜ R, since the insurance value raises faster with ρ or ∆y in the range of
R > ˜ R than it decreases in the range of R < ˜ R.
Result (28) states that the insurance value decreases with increasing ecosystem elas-
ticity for low and high levels of resilience, R < 0R < ˜ R and R > R0 > ˜ R, and increases
with increasing ecosystem elasticity in between, 0R < R < R0. This can be seen from
comparing the green lines in Figures 2 (left), 1 and 2 (right), as σ increases in this
order. Result (29) states that the insurance value vanishes as the ecosystem’s elasticity
approaches either its maximum or its minimum value, which becomes plausible from
the underlying property of the risk premium (Result 21). This can also be seen from
comparing the green lines in Figures 2 (left and right) and 1.
Having discussed the eﬀect of the ecosystem user’s risk preferences and ecosystem
properties on the insurance value of resilience, we now turn to discussing how the insur-
ance value of ecosystem resilience relates to its total economic value (Deﬁnition 3).
Proposition 2
19The total economic value of resilience, TEV (R), is given by





1 + p(R)(eρ∆y − 1)
, (30)
which has the following properties:
(i)
TEV (R) ≡ −p
0(R)∆y + IV (R). (31)
(ii)
TEV (R) ≥ 0 for all R. (32)
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
From Equation (31) it becomes obvious that the total economic value of resilience is
the sum of two components: the expected increase in income due to a marginal increase
in resilience, −p0(R)∆y, which is always positive,15 and the insurance value of increased
resilience, which may be negative or positive (cf. Proposition 1). This reﬂects the fact
that an increase in ecosystem resilience has two eﬀects on the ecosystem user’s income:
(i) it raises the expected income; (ii) it may raise or lower the riskiness of income, i.e.
deviations from expected income. Thus, the total value of resilience is more than its
insurance value, or, put the other way round, the insurance value is a value component
over and above the expected value of resilience.
Figures 1 and 2 show the total economic value as a function of resilience (blue line).
In the ﬁgures, the expected value of resilience, −p0(R)∆y, is just the vertical diﬀerence
between the curves for IV (green) and TEV (blue). Whereas the insurance value
IV (R) of resilience may be positive or negative, depending on the level of resilience R,
the expected value of resilience, −p0(R)∆y, is positive at all levels of resilience R.16 As
a consequence, for R < ˜ R where the insurance value is negative, the total economic
value of resilience is smaller than its expected value. Yet, at all levels of resilience the
15By Assumption (2), p0(R) < 0 for all R ∈ (0,1).
16Note that for σ = 0, one has p0(R) = −1 = const., so that the expected value of resilience does not
depend on the level of resilience. That is, the vertical diﬀerence between the curves for IV (green) and
TEV (blue) in Figure 1 is constant.
20total value is positive (Result 32). That means, even if the insurance value should be
negative, the mean-increasing value of resilience is large enough to oﬀset this negative
eﬀect on the total value.
5 Discussion and conclusion
In this paper we have provided a conceptual clariﬁcation of the economic insurance value
of ecosystem resilience. We have adopted a general and widely accepted deﬁnition of
insurance as mitigation of the inﬂuence of uncertainty on a person’s well-being (McCall
1987), and of insurance value as a reduction in the risk premium of the person’s income
risk lottery (Baumg¨ artner 2007). That way, we have clearly distinguished the insurance
value of ecosystem resilience, which is due to its function to reduce the riskiness of
income (“risk mitigation”), from other components of its total economic value, which
are due to resilience’s function to raise the expected income from ecosystem services.
Our analysis has yielded several interesting and important results. First, the insur-
ance value of resilience is negative for low levels of resilience and positive for high levels
of resilience. That is, ecosystem resilience actually functions as an economic insurance,
i.e. it reduces the riskiness of income from ecosystem services, only at suﬃciently high
levels of resilience; it does not function as an economic insurance but – just on the
contrary – increases the riskiness of income at low levels of resilience.
Second, the (marginal) insurance value as well as the (marginal) total value of re-
silience increase globally with the level of resilience – for some ecosystem types (namely
those with moderately positive elasticity) even monotonically: the higher the level of
resilience, the more valuable is another unit of resilience. This is in contrast to normal
economic goods, the (marginal) value of which decreases with their quantity. As unusual
as this increasing-returns property may be for normal economic goods, it is not implau-
sible and also known from other goods which are of systemic importance and thus give
rise to a non-concavity in the social objective function, such as e.g. information (Radner
and Stiglitz 1984) or biodiversity conservation (Hunter 2009). The management conse-
quences for such non-convex ecological-economic systems are discussed e.g. by Dasgupta
21and M¨ aler (2003).
Third, the insurance value of resilience is one additive component of its total eco-
nomic value. The other component is the rise in expected income due to a higher level of
resilience. So, the insurance value of resilience, which is due to its risk-mitigation func-
tion, is a value component over and above the change in the expected value of the income
lottery. While the former may be positive or negative, the latter is always positive, and
the total economic value of resilience is always positive. One reason for distinguish-
ing between the two value components of ecosystem resilience, and for studying the
insurance value separately, might be that in an encompassing management-and-decision
context the diﬀerent functions of resilience may have diﬀerent substitutes. For example,
in many rural areas of developing countries there is no substitute for agro-ecosystem
resilience in enhancing the mean level of farming income, but there is now more and
more ﬁnancial insurance available that serves as a substitute for resilience’s function to
mitigate income risks (Baumg¨ artner and Quaas 2008, Quaas and Baumg¨ artner 2008).
While we have made one speciﬁc assumption about risk preferences, i.e. constant
absolute risk aversion, actually all of our results qualitatively hold more generally for
all risk preferences satisfying the von-Neumann-Morgenstern axioms. These axioms,
including continuity and context-independence, appear plausible for standard small-risk
situations. But one may doubt that they adequately describe people’s risk preferences
when it comes to catastrophic (i.e. discontinuous) risk that irreversibly threatens the
subsistence level of income, as it is the case for many threats to the resilience of life-
supporting ecosystems. For such risks, it may be interesting to study how resilience
provides insurance under, e.g., safety-ﬁrst preferences (Roy 1952, Telser 1955, Kataoka
1963).
One general lesson from our analysis for further discussions of resilience as an in-
surance is that the concept of insurance fundamentally refers to both the objective
characteristics of risk in terms of diﬀerent possible states of nature and people’s sub-
jective risk preferences over these states. In particular, explicit reference to people’s
risk preferences is needed to meaningfully discuss insurance, to specify the economic
insurance value of resilience, and to meaningfully distinguish the insurance value from
22other components of the total economic value of ecosystem resilience.
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Appendix
Throughout the appendix, we denote the risk-aversion-weighted income loss by λ ≡ ρ∆y.
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Explicating the general deﬁnition of the risk premium (Equation 7) by the CARA-utility
function (6) yields
−e
−ρ[(1−p(R))yH+p(R)yL−RP(R)] = −(1 − p(R))e
−ρyH − p(R)e
−ρyL , (A.33)
which can be rearranged into
e
ρRP(R) =
(1 − p(R))e−ρyH + p(R)e−ρyL
e−ρ[(1−p(R))yH+p(R)yL] . (A.34)
Using ∆y = yH − yL, (A.34) can be solved for RP(R), which leads to Result (11).
ad (i). Inserting p(0) = 1 or p(1) = 0 into (11) immediately yields RP = 0 (Result 12a).
Strict positivity of RP(R) for all R ∈ (0,1) (Result 12b) can be demonstrated as follows.
Note that
1 − p(R) > e
p(R)λ − p(R)e
λ (A.35)
because the right hand side of this inequality approaches 1−p(R) as λ → 0 and strictly













23since λ > 0 and R ∈ (0,1), i.e. 0 < p(R) < 1. Inequality (A.35) can be rearranged

























> 0 , (A.39)
which yields, after dividing by ρ > 0, Result (12)b.








1 + p(R)(eλ − 1)

. (A.40)
By Assumption (2), p0(R) is strictly negative for all R ∈ (0,1). Hence, the sign of
RP 0(R) is determined by the sign of the term in braces. For R → 0, using ex > 1 + x





1 + p(R)(eλ − 1)
= λ −
eλ − 1
1 + (eλ − 1)
= λ − 1 + e
−λ
> λ − 1 + 1 − λ = 0 (A.41)









= λ − e
λ + 1
< λ − 1 − λ + 1 = 0 (A.42)
And RP 0(R) = 0 for
λ −
eλ − 1
1 + p( ˜ R)(eλ − 1)
= 0 . (A.43)
This can be uniquely solved for R = ˜ R where ˜ R is deﬁned through







which is equivalent to Result (14), since p0(R) 6= 0 for all R ∈ (0,1). Pulling all this
information together, from RP 0(0) > 0 (A.41), RP 0(1) < 0 (A.42), and RP 0(R) = 0 if
and only if R = ˜ R (A.44), it follows that Result (13) holds.








so that (A.44) and (14) can be rewritten as
p( ˜ R) ≡ F(λ) and ˜ R ≡ p





































(eλ − 1)2 =
1
eλ + e−λ − 2
−
1
λ2 < 0 for all λ , (A.49)
















2 for all λ)
F(λ) > 0 for all λ . (A.50)
(follows immediately from A.47–A.49)
From (A.50) it follows immediately that p( ˜ R) = F(λ) > 0 for all λ, which implies, with
p0(R) < 0 for all R, that ˜ R < 1 for all λ. On the other hand, from (A.47) and (A.49) one
has that F(λ) < 1/2 for all λ > 0. Hence, p( ˜ R) = F(λ) < 1/2 for all λ, which implies,
with p0(R) < 0 for all R ∈ (0,1), that ˜ R > R for all λ. This establishes Result (15a).








0(λ) > 0 . (A.51)
From that, with λ ≡ ρ∆y it follows immediately that d ˜ R/dρ > 0 and d ˜ R/d∆y > 0
(Result 15b). Using (4) and (A.46), ˜ R can be rewritten as
˜ R = p
−1 (F(λ)) = [1 − F(λ)]
1
1−σ , (A.52)
25from which it it follows that
d ˜ R
dσ
= [1 − F(λ)]
1
1−σ ln[1 − F(λ)]
1
(1 − σ)
2 < 0 , (A.53)
since 0<F(λ)<1/2 (from A.47–A.50) and σ<1 (by Assumption 4) imply that the ﬁrst
and third factors are strictly positive and the second is strictly negative.






















Under Assumption (4) one has
p(R) = 1 − R
1−σ (A.55)
p
0(R) = −(1 − σ)R
−σ (A.56)
p
00(R) = σ(1 − σ)R
−σ−1 (A.57)
Inserting (A.55)–(A.57) into (A.54) yields an explicit equation for RP 00(R) in the ele-
mentary parameters of the model, σ, ρ and ∆y. Systematic numerical simulation of this
equation for all −∞ < σ < 1 and for various ρ,∆y > 0 yields Results (16) and (17).
ad (iv). By deﬁnition, the risk premium is zero for a risk-neutral decision-maker (ρ = 0),
and is known to increase with her degree of risk-aversion ρ (e.g. Gravelle and Rees 2004:
463), which yields Result (18).
Setting ∆y = 0 in Expression (11) for RP(R) obviously yields RP(R) ≡ 0. That













p(R) + (1 − p(R))e−λ − 1

. (A.58)
As e−λ < 1 for λ > 0, and 0 < p(R) < 1 for R ∈ (0,1), the denominator in the fraction
is strictly smaller than 1, so that the term in brackets is strictly positive and the whole
expression is strictly positive, which yields Result (19).

































As p0(R) < 0 for all R ∈ (0,1), and, with Assumption (4), dp(R)/dσ < 0 for all R ∈
(0,1), the sign of dRP(R)/dσ is determined by the sign of RP 0(R). With Result (13),
Result (20) then follows immediately.
Result (21) follows from Result (11) and noting that model (4) implies
lim
σ→1 p(R) = 0 as well as lim
σ→−∞ p(R) = 1 for all R ∈ (0,1) . (A.62)
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Diﬀerentiating −RP(R) with respect to R immediately yields Result (22).
ad (i). Result (23) follows immediately from Deﬁnition (8) and Result (13).
ad (ii). Result (24) can be demonstrated by noting that Result (22) implies





λ − 1 + e
−λ










λ − 1 + e
−λ > 0 and λ − e
λ + 1 < 0 , (A.64)
since ex > 1 + x for all x > 0. Under Assumption (4), one has (A.56), so that

   
   
p0(0) = 0 and p0(1) < 0
p0(0) < 0 and p0(1) < 0
p0(0) < 0 and p0(1) ≤ 017

   
   
if

   





   
   
. (A.65)
27Combining (A.63)–(A.65), one has

   
   
IV (0) = 0 and IV (1) > 0
IV (0) < 0 and IV (1) > 0
IV (0) < 0 and IV (1) ≥ 018

   
   
if

   





   
   
, (A.66)
which means that, in any case, IV (0) < IV (1), which is Result (24). Result (25) follows
immediately from Deﬁnition (8) and Result (17).
ad (iii). Results (26), (27), (28) follow from Deﬁnition (8), the fact that the function
RP(R) is continuous and diﬀerentiable, and Results (12), (18), (19), (20). In, addition,
systematic numerical simulations of Equation (23), using model (4), for all −∞ <
σ < 1 and for various ρ,∆y > 0 have been employed to demonstrate Result (28).
Result (29) follows from Deﬁnition (8), the fact that the function RP(R) is continuous
and diﬀerentiable, and Result (21).
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Explicating the general Deﬁnition of the ecosystem user’s WTP (Equation 10) by the



















−(1 − p(R))e−ρyH − p(R)e−ρyL
[p(R + ∆R)e−ρyL + (1 − p(R + ∆R))e−ρyH]
. (A.70)





(1 − p(R)) + p(R)eλ
(1 − p(R + ∆R)) + p(R + ∆R)eλ . (A.71)
17p0(1) < 0 for σ < 1, and p0(1) → 0 as σ → 1.
18IV (1) > 0 for σ < 1, and IV (1) → 0 as σ → 1.
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1 + p(R)(eλ − 1)
. (A.76)
ad (i). Rearranging Result (30), and using Result (22), immediately yields Result (31).
ad (ii). Expression (A.76) for TEV is non-negative for all R, since −p0(R) is non-
negative and the term (eλ − 1) is strictly positive for all R. Hence, Result (32) holds.
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